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A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: The Unilateral Executive and 
the Separation of Powers 
THOMAS J. CLEARY* 
“Everybody sees what you appear to be, few feel what you are, and 
those few will not dare to oppose themselves to the many, who have the 
majesty of the state to defend them.”1 
–Niccolò Machiavelli 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States Constitution vests all executive powers in a presi-
dent.2  This is the unitary executive theory.  By virtue of this, many believe 
the president is vested with the power to act unilaterally.  This is the uni-
lateral executive theory.  However, the unilateral executive portends more 
than action.  In reality, the unilateral executive theory provides an opportu-
nity to implement a unilateral agenda.  Thus, the aim of this paper is to 
consider executive power, the separation of powers, and the unilateral ex-
ecutive theory to determine if presidential power under the separation of 
powers doctrine is actually “a wolf in sheep’s clothing.”  With regard to 
this, we will consider the intentions of the framers, the text of the Constitu-
tion, and the mandates of governmental necessity. 
The executive, legislature, and judiciary represent the three fundamen-
tal branches of government.  Yet the Constitution does not expressly de-
lineate a separation of powers doctrine.  In fact, the Constitution contains 
no provisions explicitly declaring that the powers of the three branches of 
the federal government shall be separated.  Indeed, to some degree separa-
tion of powers is a misnomer.  Professor Richard Neustadt observed that 
“[t]he Constitutional Convention of 1787 is supposed to have created a 
government of ‘separate powers.’  It did nothing of the sort.  Rather, it 
  
 * The author is an Attorney and an Adjunct Professor of Law at the Southern New England 
School of Law.  The author graduated as Valedictorian of the Southern New England School of Law in 
2007.  The author wishes to thank Professors Miriam Miquelon-Wiesmann, Frances Rudko, Kevin 
Connelly, Nozar Alaolmolki, and Judge Francis Larkin for their support and Professors John Kori-
tansky and Harvey Mansfield for their influential scholarship. 
 1. NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES 66 (1950). 
 2. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
File: Cleary - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 2 Created on:  12/6/2007 8:24:00 PM Last Printed: 12/28/2007 10:53:00 AM 
266 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 6, No. 2 
 
created a government of separated institutions sharing powers.”3  Principal 
among such powers are those executive in nature. 
As such, it is important to survey executive power.  This survey will 
begin with a select review of Alexander Hamilton’s contributions to The 
Federalist.  This includes consideration of the various executive powers 
under the U.S. Constitution.  As Hamilton observed, in order to ensure 
good government it is necessary to ensure an independent and energetic 
execution.  Given this, the preconditions necessary to maintain an energetic 
executive will be examined.  Further, the competing notions of executive 
power espoused by James Madison and Alexander Hamilton will be ex-
plored.  These notions illustrate visions of executive power that are weak 
and strong, respectively.  Finally, we must consider the leading interpreta-
tion of executive power by the U.S. Supreme Court.  In critiquing this in-
terpretation, several conceptual problems will be identified and explored. 
Next, in order to gauge the propriety of the unilateral executive theory, 
a review will be made of the separation of powers doctrine.  In surveying 
this doctrine, the roots of separation of powers theory will be considered 
together with James Madison’s contributions to The Federalist.  This re-
veals a system that is almost wholly reliant on competition among gov-
ernment branches to employ the various checks and balances, which in turn 
prevent the consolidation of government power.  In interpreting this doc-
trine, two strains have emerged in the Court’s jurisprudence.  These strains, 
respectively, are firmly rooted in “formalism” and “functionalism.”.  How-
ever, a close examination reveals that each approach is flawed.  While each 
approach has distinct shortcomings, the fatal flaw in each is the failure to 
take into account the impact of political parties on the separation of pow-
ers.  Broadly speaking, the biggest problem with the Court’s separation of 
powers jurisprudence is that it does not represent a distinct separation of 
powers law, and it does not take into account the role of political parties in 
unifying government. 
Having briefly reviewed executive power and the separation of powers 
doctrine, the primary focus will switch to the unilateral executive theory 
and its sources of support.  More specifically, five sources of support are 
identified.  The five sources include: (1) the unitary nature of the executive 
office; (2) implied executive powers under the Constitution; (3) executive 
tools such as signing statements, executive orders, and executive agree-
ments; (4) supportive legislation; and (5) the marginalization of the legisla-
tive and judicial branches of government.  A review of these sources sug-
gests that political parties, in marginalizing the legislative and judicial 
  
 3. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE POLITICS 
OF LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 29 (1990). 
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branches, can magnify the power of the four remaining sources.  Notably, 
without this magnification it appears that the four remaining sources would 
be consistent with the Constitution.  Indeed, there is substantial evidence 
indicating that the framers intended unilateral executive action.4  More 
importantly, such action may represent a constitutional necessity.  How-
ever, in the end the role of political parties and the magnification of the 
remaining sources may impermissibly tip the balance of power among our 
three branches of government. 
The degree to which unilateral executive action and agenda are accept-
able must be determined relative to both the text of our Constitution and 
the mandates of necessity.  But what powers are encapsulated by the text of 
the Constitution and who is to interpret this text?  Also, what are the man-
dates of necessity?  It is of course necessary to acknowledge and explore 
these questions in addressing the propriety of the unilateral executive the-
ory.  Finally, in conclusion, the genealogy of modern executive power will 
be considered relative to the unilateral executive theory and the perhaps 
veiled character of the executive office. 
II.  EXECUTIVE POWER 
In order to understand the unilateral executive phenomenon, it is first 
necessary to understand executive power in the United States.  The contri-
butions of Alexander Hamilton to The Federalist are particularly helpful in 
developing such an understanding.  By way of background, Hamilton was 
the most avid contributor to The Federalist, which was written as an au-
thoritative explanation of the proposed government and its Constitution.  
The Federalist was published in New York newspapers beginning on Oc-
tober 27, 1787 in an effort to secure state ratification of the proposed U.S. 
Constitution.5  In The Federalist, Hamilton considers each facet of the pro-
posed executive and explains how they combine to produce the characteris-
tics of good government.  In doing so he paints the picture of an energetic 
president who is vested with implied executive powers, which he can uni-
laterally wield. 
In The Federalist No. 69, Hamilton examines “the real characters of 
the proposed executive” in an attempt to gain support for a unitary execu-
tive.6  Having just recently escaped the dominion of the Crown, the Ameri-
  
 4. See generally JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 
47 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1987) (1920) (discussing the corollaries of establishing a unitary executive). 
 5. Charles R. Kesler, Introduction to THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, at ix–x (Clinton Rossiter ed., Sig-
net Classic 2003) (1961). 
 6. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 414. 
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can colonists were of course weary of centralized power.  Therefore, Ham-
ilton’s examination of the executive was a crucial task in helping to defuse 
their concerns and secure ratification of the Constitution.  In other words, 
Hamilton’s analysis was focused as a means limited to this end.  As a re-
sult, Hamilton did not explore the murky depths of executive power in The 
Federalist to as great an extent as he did in later works.  A review of these 
later works indicates that he did not reveal key portions of his constitu-
tional philosophy in The Federalist. 
The unitary character of the executive branch was one of the more con-
troversial aspects of the proposed executive power.7  Many framers wor-
ried that consolidating the executive power in a single man would in effect 
create “the fetus of monarchy.”8  Thus, it is not surprising that the unitary 
character is the first feature of the executive that Hamilton addresses.  He 
notes that the most prominent feature of the executive is “that the executive 
authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested in a single magistrate.”9  He 
then examines the characteristics of specific executive powers to distin-
guish them from the power wielded by the British King. 
Unlike the British King, the president is elected for a term of four 
years and as such he wields no hereditary power.  Nevertheless, Hamilton 
recommends that the president be “re-eligible as often as the people of the 
United States shall think him worthy of their confidence.”10  In short, Ham-
ilton believes that the president must be accountable for his actions and 
that a four year term with indefinite re-eligibility will provide for increased 
accountability.  Hamilton argued that term limits would have five ill ef-
fects.  He argued that term limits: (1) would produce a diminution of the 
inducements to good behavior; (2) would encourage the tendency of using 
“corrupt expedients” because only a limited time is available to achieve 
presidential objectives; (3) would deprive the community of the advantage 
of having a more experienced executive; (4) would banish “men from sta-
tions in which, in certain emergencies of the state, their presence might be 
of the greatest moment to the public interest or safety”;11 and (5) would 
“operate as a constitutional interdiction of stability in the administration . . 
. [b]y necessitating a change of men, in the first office of the nation.”12  
Notably, the first and second of the ill effects may be troublesome when 
coupled together with unilateral executive power. 
  
 7. This is well illustrated by the contentious debates that took place on June 1, 1787 at the Consti-
tutional Convention.  See MADISON, supra note 4, at 45–47. 
 8. Id. at 46. 
 9. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 6, at 414. 
 10. Id. 
 11. THE FEDERALIST NO. 72 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 437. 
 12. Id. at 438. 
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Hamilton goes on to note that the president may also be removed while 
in office through impeachment for treason, bribery or other high crimes 
and misdemeanors.13  However, Article I, Section 2, Clause 6 of the Con-
stitution stipulates that a two-thirds majority is required to impeach the 
president.  As will be discussed below, the two party political system and 
the power of party affiliation and loyalty can significantly reduce the risk 
of presidential impeachment.  By virtue of this reduced risk, a political 
environment is produced, which can be characterized as more hospitable to 
executive hegemony. 
Hamilton also notes that the president is vested with a qualified, as op-
posed to an absolute, veto power.  He argued that this functions as a check 
on both the executive and legislative branches.14  He also remarks that the 
president, in his capacity as commander in chief, is limited in his control of 
the armed forces to when they are “called into the actual service of the 
United States.”15  This provides little consolation though, as the president 
himself may call them into service.  This point is well illustrated by the 
numerous military “conflicts” and “interventions” that have occurred 
throughout the history of the United States.  Interestingly, this seems to 
remain true despite the enactment of the 1973 War Powers Resolution, 
which sought to limit the power of the president to wage war without the 
approval of Congress.  This is not surprising given Hamilton’s assurance 
that “[t]he direction of war implies the direction of the common strength; 
and the power of directing and employing the common strength, forms a 
usual and essential part in the definition of the executive authority.”16  In 
fact, Hamilton finds that “[o]f all the cares or concerns of government, the 
direction of war most peculiarly demands . . . the exercise of power by a 
single hand.”17 
He also notes that the president has the substantial ability to grant re-
prieves and pardons.18  However, he observed that this power is not ex-
tended to cover cases of impeachment.  Yet it seems clear that this limited 
restriction is only meaningful if the impeachment process has real teeth.  If 
history is any indication, presidential impeachment has been somewhat of 
a paper tiger.  It appears likely that political parties may have played a pri-
mary role in de-clawing this tiger. 
  
 13. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 6, at 414. 
 14. Id. at 415. 
 15. Id. 
 16. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 446. 
 17. Id. 
 18. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 6, at 415. 
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In addition, Hamilton observed that the president can recommend 
measures to Congress that he believes are necessary and expedient.19  At 
first glance, this may seem like a nominal power.  To the contrary, in the 
presence of powerful party allegiances, this is actually a quite significant 
power.  In fact, this ability can actually serve as a vehicle with which to 
unilaterally advance an executive agenda.  For instance, if the president 
and a majority in Congress are unified through party affiliation and the 
president recommends a measure, generally speaking, that measure will 
receive additional support simply by virtue of his party affiliation.  There-
fore, the president can exercise his power to introduce measures and can 
rely to some degree on party affiliation to, in effect, unilaterally advance 
his agenda through the legislature. 
It is also important to observe that in listing executive powers, Hamil-
ton seemingly classifies the provision to “take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed” as a power.20  This is very significant, as will be discussed 
below, because it seems to infer that the president has a somewhat open-
ended source of implied power.  In fact, this clause has been interpreted 
quite broadly in recent years.  Further, the president has broad appointment 
powers and the power to commission all officers of the United States.21  In 
addition, the president has exclusive removal power over officials perform-
ing strictly executive functions.22  The power to remove is the power to 
control.  These powers help to secure loyalty among commissioned offi-
cers and appointees, which in turn increases his chances of successfully 
implementing a unilateral agenda.  Finally, Hamilton observed that the 
president is vested with the power to receive ambassadors and other public 
ministers and the power to make treaties with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.  Surely, these powers provide the opportunity to substantially in-
fluence U.S. foreign policy.  The sum of his powers in this area provides 
the president the means with which to independently advance his agenda 
on a global scale. 
The powers described thus far provide the impetus for energetic execu-
tion.  In The Federalist No. 70, Hamilton confirms that “[e]nergy in the 
executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.”23  
Hamilton finds that energy in the executive “is essential to the protection 
of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the 
  
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. at 416. 
 21. Id. at 416, 419. 
 22. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (finding that the president has exclusive 
removal power over all executive officials); cf. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 
(1935) (limiting the president’s exclusive removal power to officials performing strictly executive as 
opposed to quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions). 
 23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 421. 
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steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property . . . [and] to 
the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of 
faction, and of anarchy.”24  On the other hand, Hamilton deplores a feeble 
executive as this implies feeble execution.25  With regard to this it is help-
ful to consider Professor John Koritansky’s insights on Hamilton’s phi-
losophy of government and administration. 
From the point of view of this interpretation we can read with an 
enlightened eye what Hamilton says in Federalist No. 68 about his 
degree of agreement with Alexander Pope’s famous statement that, 
“For forms of government let fools contest—That which is best 
administered is best.”  It is true that Hamilton brands Pope’s 
statement a “political heresy” but we should note how careful he is 
to state his disagreement in a way that reveals a considerable 
agreement.  Without breaking sentences Hamilton follows Pope’s 
heretical statement by saying, “. . . yet we may safely pronounce 
that the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency 
to produce a good administration.”  In contrast to Pope’s state-
ment, forms of government are important, but they are only so in 
so far as they tend to promote good administration, Hamilton’s re-
sponse to Pope is very clever; for while he does charge Pope with 
heresy, he misses the point of that heresy—or rather, he actually 
endorses it!  Surely the scandalous or heretical element in what 
Pope says is the suggestion that it does not matter what ends or 
purposes a government owns; so long as whatever it does it does 
effectively and efficiently, and takes care of themselves.  And 
Hamilton appears to agree.  Pope had been careless—he had per-
haps misused a bit of poetic license—in saying that “forms” are 
absolutely unimportant.  Forms, in truth, have a secondary impor-
tance as they tend to foster or hinder good administration.  But the 
point remains that the relatively pedestrian standards of admini-
stration as such, effectiveness and efficiency, are the standards of 
government as a whole.  It is this consideration that recommends 
the most important part of the formal structure of the government 
Hamilton is helping to establish, namely the unitary character of 
the executive.26 
Overall, Hamilton identifies four ingredients necessary for an energetic 
executive.  These four ingredients are unity, duration, adequate provisions 
  
 24. Id. at 421–22. 
 25. Id. at 422. 
 26. John Koritansky, Alexander Hamilton’s Philosophy of Government and Administration, 
PUBLIUS, Spring 1979, at 99, 112–13. 
File: Cleary - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 2 Created on:  12/6/2007 8:24:00 PM Last Printed: 12/28/2007 10:53:00 AM 
272 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 6, No. 2 
 
for support, and competent powers.27  With regard to unity, Hamilton states 
that “[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize 
the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the pro-
ceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is in-
creased, these qualities will be diminished.”28  In short, he finds that a uni-
tary executive will be more efficient and easier to hold accountable for his 
mistakes.29  Accordingly, he finds that unity can be destroyed “in two 
ways: either by vesting the power in two or more magistrates of equal dig-
nity and authority, or by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject in whole 
or in part, to the control and cooperation of others, in the capacity of coun-
selors to him.”30  With regard to duration, as discussed above, Hamilton 
believes that there is a need for indefinite re-eligibility.  Adequate provi-
sions for support are also necessary.  This involves financially insulating 
the president from Congress as otherwise “[t]hey might, in most cases, 
either reduce him by famine, or tempt him by largesses, to surrender at 
discretion his judgment to their inclinations.”31  Finally, in terms of compe-
tent powers Hamilton reviews the veto, military, treaty-making, and ap-
pointing powers of the executive, which “combines, as far as republican 
principles will admit, all the requisites to [executive] energy.”32 
Ultimately, two competing notions of executive power have devel-
oped.  One view, the “strong executive theory,” finds that a president may 
do anything not specifically prohibited by the Constitution.  The other 
view, “the weak executive theory,” finds that a president may only exercise 
powers that are expressly enumerated to him by the Constitution or dele-
gated to him by Congress under one of its enumerated powers.  Professor 
Harvey Mansfield describes the two notions of executive power as “a weak 
executive resulting from the notion that the people are represented in the 
legislature, [and] a strong executive from the notion that they are embodied 
in the executive.”33 
Interestingly, in terms of a constitutional executive, these two notions 
can be traced back to Madison and Hamilton, respectively.  While Hamil-
ton and Madison each made substantial contributions to The Federalist 
they did not share similar views on executive power.  Upon close inspec-
tion it appears there is “tension between Hamilton and Madison in The 
Federalist Papers regarding representation, and correspondingly, regarding 
  
 27. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 23, at 422. 
 28. Id. at 423. 
 29. Id. at 423, 426. 
 30. Id. at 423. 
 31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 439. 
 32. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 462 (emphasis added).  
 33. HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR., TAMING THE PRINCE: THE AMBIVALENCE OF MODERN EXECUTIVE 
POWER 5–6 (1989). 
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the issue of executive initiative versus legislative supremacy.”34  Seem-
ingly, their goal of securing constitutional ratification behooved them to 
avoid a confrontation on the issue in The Federalist.  Still, a confrontation 
regarding executive power was on the horizon. 
Following ratification of the Constitution, in 1793 President George 
Washington declared by executive proclamation that America was “neutral 
in the war between Britain and France.”35  Following Washington’s proc-
lamation, Madison and Hamilton engaged in a famous debate on executive 
power.  In support of the strong executive view, Hamilton defended the 
proclamation under the assumed name of “Pacificus.”36  On the other hand, 
in support of the weak executive view, Madison attacked the proclamation 
under the assumed name of “Helvidius.”37 
While Hamilton’s passages in The Federalist might seem to indicate 
otherwise, he was a firm subscriber to the strong executive view.  As Pro-
fessor Koritansky notes, “[w]hen Hamilton writes about the executive in 
the Federalist he has to respond to the fear among his readers of executive 
tyranny, and so he veils the most expansive possible interpretation of the 
executive’s constitutional powers.”38  To the contrary, as Pacificus, “his 
purpose is to announce and vindicate the more expansive interpretation.”39  
Essentially, Hamilton argued, “executive power, unlike legislative power, 
is more than the sum of its parts” and therefore “executive power, in the 
singular, can be illustrated, but it cannot be enumerated because it cannot 
be exhausted.”40  Further, Hamilton argued that the president has the power 
to judge for himself the meaning of law with regard to his execution the-
reof.41  This interpretation clearly paints a picture in which the executive 
emerges not as a coequal branch of government, but rather as the ultimate 
sovereign entity in the United States.  Establishing the president as the 
sovereign is not surprising if the preservation of the United States is the 
ultimate province of the executive as Hamilton maintains. 
Conversely, as Helividius, Madison denied the executive any discre-
tion as to foreign affairs or interpreting the law.42  In stark contrast to Ham-
ilton, Madison believed that the president’s only responsibility is to faith-
fully execute the laws—seemingly with a blind eye toward the resulting 
  
 34. Koritansky, supra note 26, at 114.  
 35. MANSFIELD, supra note 33, at 275. 
 36. Id. at 276. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Koritansky, supra note 26, at 115 (emphasis added). 
 39. Id. 
 40. MANSFIELD, supra note 33, at 276 (emphasis added). 
 41. Id. at 277. 
 42. Id. at 278. 
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consequences.43  In light of such notions, the efficacy of Madison’s ap-
proach appears to be questionable at best.  Surely the enumerated executive 
powers serve as an illustration that the president was not intended to be 
wholly and blindly subservient to the legislature.  Still, Madison’s ap-
proach paints a picture in which the legislature is the ultimate sovereign 
entity in the United States.  As a practical matter, this poses several prob-
lems.  Most importantly, for reasons described above by Hamilton, this is 
antithetical to an energetic administration.  This, in turn, reduces sovereign 
efficiency and security; in a time of national emergency these problems 
could very well be fatal.  Again, “the true test of a good government is its 
aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration.”44  If history is 
any indication, legislative governance fails this test miserably.  It follows 
that “[c]ontemporary political scientists generally concede, some reluc-
tantly and some with enthusiasm, that Congress cannot govern and that 
only the president can.”45 
The struggle between the strong and weak executive theories continues 
to this day.  The longevity of this controversy is not surprising though be-
cause neither The Federalist nor the Constitution contains an exhaustive 
list of executive powers; neither expressly defines executive power per se.  
Mansfield observed that “[t]he lack of an official definition allows each 
president to become responsible for creating his own” definition of execu-
tive power.46  This explains the historical fluctuations between strong and 
weak presidents.  Notably, the strong view has been adopted by many of 
our greatest presidents, including Abraham Lincoln and Theodore Roose-
velt.  Roosevelt argued that the president could “do anything that the needs 
of the Nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the Constitu-
tion.”47 
In light of the ambiguity surrounding executive power, the Court has 
had no easy task in identifying its parameters.  Not surprisingly, the Court 
has struggled at completing this task.  This is well exemplified by the tri-
partite analysis of Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, otherwise known as The Steel Seizure Case.48  In this case, the 
Court was faced with the task of deciding whether President Truman was 
“acting within his constitutional power when he issued [Executive Order 
10340] directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and op-
  
 43. Id. 
 44. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 413. 
 45. Koritansky, supra note 26, at 121. 
 46. MANSFIELD, supra note 33, at 278. 
 47. THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 389 (1913). 
 48. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
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erate most of the Nation’s steel mills.”49  At the time, a dispute had arisen 
between the steel companies and their employees, which prompted the 
Steelworkers’ Union to give notice of a nation-wide strike.50  The president 
feared that such a strike would result in a stoppage of steel production at 
the height of the Korean War.  Clearly this posed a threat to our national 
security.  As such, President Truman argued that seizure of the steel mills 
was necessary to avoid a national catastrophe and was authorized by the 
aggregate of his constitutional powers as the nation’s chief executive and 
the commander in chief of the armed forces.51  The Court did not agree and 
held that the seizure order was unconstitutional.52 
Nevertheless, Justice Jackson concurred in this decision and in doing 
so he formulated a tripartite analysis to identify the contours of executive 
power.  His approach has been frequently referenced and heralded as “the 
most celebrated judicial opinion of the separation of powers canon.”53  The 
approach involves cataloging executive action into one of three distinct 
groups.  The first group includes presidential action that is pursuant to 
congressional authority.  Justice Jackson argued that in this group presi-
dential power is at its apex.54  The second group includes presidential ac-
tion in the context of congressional silence.  Justice Jackson refers to this 
group as “a zone of twilight” in which the president “can only rely upon 
his own independent powers.”55  The third group includes presidential ac-
tions that are incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress.  
Here Justice Jackson finds that the president “can rely only upon his own 
Constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over 
the matter.”56 
Troublingly, Justice Jackson’s tripartite approach seems to indicate an 
executive subservience to the legislature.  Because Congress creates laws 
and the president is entrusted with their execution does not necessarily 
mean that he is subservient to the legislature.  Stating that presidential 
power is at its apex when pursuant to congressional authority implies that 
the president acts with less strength in exercising his independent powers.  
This suggests an executive subservience to the legislature.  The third group 
places the president in a similar position by defining executive power as 
being residual in nature when in conflict with congressional sentiment.  
  
 49. Id. at 582. 
 50. Id. at 582–83. 
 51. Id. at 582. 
 52. Id. at 589. 
 53. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
2311, 2314 (2006). 
 54. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 55. Id. at 637. 
 56. Id. 
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This also limits executive independence.  Hamilton finds that executive 
dependence on the legislative body violates “fundamental principles of 
good government.”57  To be sure, the president is responsible for taking 
care that the laws are faithfully executed.  Still, this does not fully encapsu-
late his duties or intended function.  Indeed, the presidential oath tellingly 
states, “I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the 
Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, 
preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.”58  This 
oath confirms that the province of the president is not simply to execute 
laws but more accurately it is to execute the office and to defend the Con-
stitution.  This is consistent with Hamilton’s notion that the preservation of 
the Union must ultimately be the province of the executive. 
Overall, Justice Jackson’s approach seems somewhat inconsistent with 
this notion and in practice can alter the nature of the executive office.  In 
other words, Justice Jackson’s analysis may reduce the president to a mere 
messenger boy for Congress.  This could have dangerous consequences in 
the face of exigent circumstances.  As Justice Vinson observed “[u]nder 
this messenger-boy concept of the Office, the President cannot even act to 
preserve legislative programs from destruction so that Congress will have 
something left to act upon.”59  In short, Justice Jackson’s approach substan-
tially reduces executive power and in doing so changes the character of the 
office.  At bottom, the president’s power is constitutionally proscribed and 
“is not to be construed as deriving from Congress’ actions, but rather that it 
derives from the Constitution itself, and that it can set itself into motion.”60  
It follows that the discretion and executive powers vested in the presi-
dent may be more expansive than is recognized by Justice Jackson’s analy-
sis.  The actual latitude of this discretion will be considered in greater de-
tail below.  Broadly speaking, the existence of expansive executive powers 
is not surprising given the lofty charge of preserving, protecting, and de-
fending the Constitution.  In connection with this, it is also not surprising 
that the president is capable of acting unilaterally.  Given the nature of his 
responsibilities, this seems to be somewhat of a necessity.  However, at 
some point unilateral executive action can change the balance of govern-
ment power.  It can lead to the usurpation of power intended for coordinate 
branches of government.  This of course undermines the spirit behind the 
separation of powers doctrine.  Consequently, the question becomes how 
  
 57. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 432. 
 58. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 (emphasis added). 
 59. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 708–09 (Vinson, J., dissenting). 
 60. Koritansky, supra note 26, at 117. 
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much unilateral action is acceptable and who is charged with determining 
the benchmark for acceptability? 
III.  THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
The separation of powers doctrine is aimed at preventing the consoli-
dation of government power and is a hallmark of the U.S. government.  
More than a hallmark though, it “is the chief of the ‘auxiliary precautions’ 
necessary against oppression by government . . . [and] is auxiliary [only] to 
‘dependence on the people’ or to representation, the primary precaution.”61  
However, separation of powers theory does not owe its genesis to our 
founding fathers.  In fact, the categorization and separation of government 
powers was a topic discussed by many, including Enlightenment philoso-
phers John Locke and Baron de Montesquieu. 
In his Second Treatise on government, Locke grouped government 
power into two distinct categories: legislative and executive.62  Locke ar-
gued that consolidation of these powers was dangerous.  Specifically, he 
worried that there is  
too great a temptation to humane frailty apt to grasp at Power, for 
the same Persons who have the Power of making Laws, to have 
also in their hands the power to execute them, whereby they may 
exempt themselves from Obedience to the Laws they make, and 
suit the Law, both in its making and execution, to their own private 
advantage.63 
For this reason Locke argued that laws require perpetual execution by a 
separate body of government. 
Similarly, Montesquieu discussed the ideal separation of government 
powers, which he coined as “trias politicas.”64  Specifically, Montesquieu 
described a division of political power between executive, legislative, and 
judicial government functions.  He based this model on the British system, 
in which he perceived a separation of powers between the King, Parlia-
ment, and the judiciary.  Ultimately, he believed that political liberty could 
be found only when there is no abuse of power.65  He stated: “But constant 
experience shows us that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it, 
  
 61. HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR., AMERICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL SOUL 115 (1991). 
 62. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT: SECOND TREATISE § 143, reprinted in 1 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, at ch. 10, doc. 3 (Peter Laslett ed., 1965), available at http://press-pubs. 
uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch10s3.html. 
 63. Id. § 144. 
 64. See CHARLES DE SECONDAT, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (Prometheus Books 2002) (1900). 
 65. Id. at 150. 
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and to carry his authority as far as it will go.”66  To prevent such abuse, 
Montesquieu firmly believed that “power should be a check to power.”67  
In other words, he believed that government must divide power to prevent 
its abuse. 
The force of Montesquieu’s analysis is reflected in the debates at the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787.  For instance, on July 17, 1787, James 
Madison remarked that “[i]f it be essential to the preservation of liberty 
that the Legisl; Execut: & Judiciary powers be separate, it is essential to a 
maintenance of the separation, that they should be independent of each 
other.”68  Citing Montesquieu, Madison explains that such a separation is 
necessary, otherwise “tyrannical laws may be made and may be executed 
in a tyrannical manner.”69  For this reason, Madison strongly urged that a 
system of checks be designed to balance and harmonize power among sep-
arate branches of government.70 
The need for a separation of powers was further examined in The Fed-
eralist.  Because men are not angels, Madison argued in The Federalist No. 
51 that “[i]n framing a government which is to be administered by men 
over men . . . you must first enable the government to control the gov-
erned; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”71  Madison further 
argued that in order to achieve such stability, in the structure of govern-
ment, “ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”72  In light of 
American federalism, this means counteracting ambition in both the federal 
and state levels of government.73  In other words, America requires a sepa-
ration of powers between distinct levels of government and a separation of 
powers within each level of government.  Overall, Madison believed that 
the ideal government must be structured to furnish proper checks and bal-
ances between executive, legislative, and judicial branches of govern-
ment.74  He believed this could be achieved only by giving to those who 
administer each such branch “the necessary constitutional means, and per-
sonal motives, to resist encroachments of the other [branches].”75 
Notably, in his original draft of what would become the Bill of Rights, 
Madison included a proposed amendment that would make the separation 
  
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. MADISON, supra note 4, at 311.  
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at 312–13. 
 71. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 319 (emphasis added). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 320. 
 74. Id. at 317–18. 
 75. Id. at 318–19. 
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of powers explicit.76  More specifically, Madison proposed as his sixteenth 
amendment that: 
The powers delegated by the Constitution to the government of 
the United States, shall be exercised as therein appropriated, so 
that the Legislative shall never exercise the powers vested in the 
Executive or Judicial; nor the Executive the powers vested in the 
Legislative or Judicial; nor the Judicial the powers vested in the 
Legislative or Executive.77  
However, his proposal was rejected because his fellow congressmen be-
lieved the separation of powers was implicit in the Constitution.78  In other 
words, they believed the substance of the amendment was already provided 
for in the text of the Constitution itself.  As such, the separation of powers 
doctrine is not expressly delineated anywhere in the Constitution. 
Still, the structure of the Constitution reflects the intent to create three 
separate branches of government, and it addresses these three branches in 
turn.  Notably, the legislature is the first branch of government addressed 
in the Constitution.  In fact, the first sentence of Article I states: “All legis-
lative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United 
States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”  The 
first sentence of Article II states that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested 
in a President of the United States of America.”  Importantly, this language 
renders the executive branch the only branch of the federal government to 
rest its power in an individual as opposed to an institution.  Finally, the 
judiciary is addressed in the first sentence of Article III, which states: “The 
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, 
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish.”  The prominent placement of these sentences and the fact 
that each article is dedicated to a separate branch of government under-
scores the vital importance that separation of powers played in the minds 
of the framers. 
The fact that the legislature is addressed in the first article is not sur-
prising given Madison’s insistence that “[i]n republican government the 
legislative authority, necessarily, predominates.”79  Madison believed that 
  
 76. CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MONDAY, 24TH 
AUGUST, 1789, at 3 (New York, Greenleaf 1789), available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/ 
D?rbpebib:3:./temp/~ammem_OEj4. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Exploring Constitutional Conflicts: Separation of Powers, http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/ 
projects/ftrials/conlaw/separationofpowers.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2007). 
 79. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 71, at 319.  The issue of legislative versus executive su-
premacy would later become a focal point for the development of great tension between Hamilton and 
Madison.  This will be discussed in greater detail below. 
File: Cleary - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 2 Created on:  12/6/2007 8:24:00 PM Last Printed: 12/28/2007 10:53:00 AM 
280 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 6, No. 2 
 
dividing the legislature into two competing branches would help to limit 
legislative supremacy.80  Apart from internal constraints, Madison also 
believed that it was necessary to prevent any one branch from dominating 
the others and “to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further 
precautions.”81  Yet, as Alexander Hamilton notes, “the insufficiency of a 
mere parchment delineation of the boundaries of each [branch is clear]; . . . 
and the necessity of furnishing each with constitutional arms for its own 
defense, has been inferred and proved.”82  However, this presupposes a 
system where there is competition among government branches, which 
compels the use of their defenses. 
Still, many structural safeguards were implemented to assist in achiev-
ing this goal.  For instance, broadly speaking, congressional authority to 
enact laws can be checked by an executive veto, or by a judicial determina-
tion that a law is unconstitutional.  Similarly, executive action might be 
checked congressionally through budget control and impeachment, and 
judicially through a determination that an executive act is unconstitutional.  
Finally, the judiciary may be checked through executive nominations and 
congressionally through the confirmation and impeachment processes.  Of 
course these examples represent only a few of the many structural safe-
guards that characterize and shape our understanding of the amorphous 
separation of powers doctrine. 
Professor E. Donald Elliott observed that because there is no express 
constitutional explication of the separation of powers doctrine, “the ‘text’ 
in separation of powers law is everything that the Framers did and said in 
making the original Constitution plus the history of our government since 
the founding.”83  As a result, the judiciary has had no easy task in outlining 
the contours of this doctrine and trying to enforce its underlying principles.  
This difficult task is further complicated by the need to address political 
parties and their ability to undermine the separation of powers doctrine.  
Not surprisingly, given its propensity for unilateral action, many of the 
most difficult separation of powers issues involve the executive branch. 
In considering the separation of powers doctrine, it is clear that two 
competing approaches have emerged in the Court’s jurisprudence—the 
“formal” and “functional” approaches.  The formalist approach is charac-
terized by a rigid interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine.84  
  
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 31, at 441 (emphasis added). 
 83. E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence Is So Abysmal, 57 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 506, 508 (1989). 
 84. This approach was utilized by the Court in many cases.  See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. 
Citizens for Abatement of Noise, 501 U.S. 252, 255 (1991) (finding a separation of powers violation in 
creating a Board of Review composed of nine members of Congress that was given authority to veto 
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This seems to be the predominant approach in the Court’s jurisprudence.85  
Under this approach the Court views the legislative, executive, and judicial 
vesting clauses as not only a grant of specific powers but also as a limita-
tion on each branch of government.  In other words, the formalist approach 
interprets the vesting clauses of the Constitution as affirmative grants of 
power and power-restricting boundaries.  Through its rigid interpretation, 
this approach sacrifices government flexibility at the altar of alleged tex-
tual formalism. 
The formalist approach places great emphasis on maintaining exclusiv-
ity of legislative, executive, and judicial power.  This approach seems to 
overlook the fact that “[v]irtually every part of the government Congress 
has created—the Department of Agriculture as well as the Securities and 
Exchange Commission—exercises all three of the governmental functions 
the Constitution so carefully allocates among Congress, President, and 
Court.”86  More importantly, it is necessary to share power to check power.  
In fact, the various checks and balances structured into the Constitution 
serve as a reminder that our system, while divided into separate branches, 
anticipates that power will be shared.  As Justice Jackson has noted, 
“[w]hile the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also 
contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a work-
able government.”87  Inasmuch as formalist rigidity can prevent this from 
happening, formalism loses track of the Constitution’s predominant pur-
pose. 
Contrary to the formalist approach, the Court has also adopted a func-
tionalist approach, which places less emphasis on rigidity and more em-
phasis on pragmatism and governmental flexibility.88  This approach “per-
ceived overlapping areas of competence rather than strict boundaries, an 
evolutionary rather than textual and historical approach, and the use of 
balancing tests to determine whether new arrangements could be accom-
modated.”89  While this approach provides for greater flexibility, it does so 
  
decision of an agency exercising executive power); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 728–29 (1986) 
(holding that separation of powers was violated by maintaining removal power over an executive 
officer by Congress); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953–54 (1983) (holding that Congress may not 
promulgate a statute granting to itself a legislative veto over actions of the executive branch consistent 
with separation of powers principles). 
 85. This is underscored by the fact that after trying the competing approach the Court ultimately 
reverted back to the formalist approach in Airports Authority, 501 U.S. at 255. 
 86. Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—A 
Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORN. L. REV. 488, 492 (1987) (emphasis in original). 
 87. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 579 (1952) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 88. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 684, 692 (1988) (upholding law which limited the president’s 
executive power by placing a “good cause” requirement on the president’s ability to remove an inde-
pendent counsel). 
 89. NORMAN REDLICH ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 273–74 (3d ed. 2005). 
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at the expense of establishing clear boundaries.  The functionalist approach 
eschews such boundaries in favor of ad hoc judicial determinations and 
discretion.  Unfortunately, this provides very little guidance as to the con-
stitutional contours of the separation of powers, and ultimately, this ap-
proach places the doctrine at great risk of being distorted by the ever-
changing tides of judicial sentiment. 
On the one hand, the formalist approach has the benefit of drawing 
clear-cut boundaries.  Regretfully, these boundaries seem to focus only on 
the respective vesting clauses as opposed to the intended goal of providing 
“the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist en-
croachments of the other [branches].”90  On the other hand, the functional-
ist approach does have the flexibility necessary to achieve this goal.  Un-
fortunately, however, the functionalist approach offers almost no clear 
boundaries.  Further, inasmuch as this is the case, the functionalist ap-
proach renders the separation of powers highly susceptible to manipula-
tion.  Most importantly, however, both approaches fail to take into account 
the impact of political parties on the separation of powers.  Overall, the 
Court confirms that “the greatest security against tyranny—the accumula-
tion of excessive authority in a single Branch—lies not in a hermetic divi-
sion among the Branches, but in a carefully crafted system of checked and 
balanced power within each Branch.”91  Yet, for the aforementioned rea-
sons, both the formalist and functionalist approaches fail to adequately 
safeguard this security. 
Given this, it is not surprising that constitutional theorists, such as Pro-
fessor Elliott, describe our separation of powers jurisprudence as simply 
“abysmal.”92  Elliott states that our separation of powers jurisprudence is 
abysmal “because the Supreme Court has failed for over two hundred years 
of our history to develop a law of separation of powers.”93  Rather than 
create a separation of powers law, the Court has merely “reached a collec-
tion of results in separation of powers cases” and in so doing has undenia-
bly failed to develop “a body of principle and theory that is coherent and 
useful in enabling the system ‘to be wiser than the individuals who consti-
tute it.’”94  As a result, Elliott finds that “our separation of powers law is 
now dumber than the individuals who make it, as if there were some virtue 
  
 90. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 71, at 318–19. 
 91. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989).  
 92. Elliott, supra note 83, at 506. 
 93. Id. at 507 (emphasis added). 
 94. Id. (quoting Elliott, Holmes and Evolution: Legal Process as Artificial Intelligence, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 113, 145 (1984)). 
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in judges blinding themselves to the practical consequences of their deci-
sions about governmental structure.”95 
The failure to take into account the impact of political parties and the 
failure to create a clearly defined and functional separation of powers law 
has had many unfortunate consequences.  Most troubling is the seeming 
inability of the Court to prevent disproportionate concentrations of gov-
ernment power from gradually developing over time.  This is particularly 
troublesome if we give credence to Lord Acton’s warning that “[p]ower 
tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”96  To be sure, 
James Madison saw the concentration of government power as the root of 
tyranny.  Madison states in The Federalist No. 47 that the “accumulation of 
all powers, legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether 
of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, 
may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”97  Nowhere is 
the risk of consolidation more pronounced than in the executive branch, 
which is unitary by its very nature.  After all, Article II vests all executive 
power in “a President of the United States of America.”98  At bottom, of 
the many problems with the Court’s separation of powers jurisprudence, 
perhaps the most notable is its reluctance to confront the unilateral execu-
tive phenomenon. 
IV.  THE UNILATERAL EXECUTIVE 
In simplest terms, the unilateral executive can be understood to mean 
an executive acting unilaterally.  However, to truly understand this phe-
nomenon one must dig deeper.  The true hallmark of the unilateral execu-
tive is not executive action per se.  Rather, the heart of the unilateral ex-
ecutive phenomenon lies in the pursuit of a unilateral executive agenda, 
and the unilateral determination of the means with which to achieve this 
agenda.  This in turn requires a consolidation of power in the executive. 
In tracing the consolidation of power in the executive, it is important to 
first observe that there is a consolidation of power in the federal govern-
ment.  The Supremacy Clause establishes the Constitution, federal statutes, 
and U.S. treaties as “the supreme Law of the Land.”99  In short, this en-
sures that federal law will trump state law.  A fair inference from this is 
  
 95. Id. at 507. 
 96. Phrases.org – Phrase Finder, http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/288200.html (last visited Dec. 
04, 2007).  This phrase was coined by Lord Acton in a letter to Bishop Mandell Creighton in 1887.  Id. 
 97. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 298. 
 98. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
 99. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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that the federal agenda and policies, which are encapsulated by law, will 
overshadow conflicting state policies.  Moreover, in McCulloch v. Mary-
land, Chief Justice Marshall found expansive federal power in the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause.  This clause gives to Congress the power to “make 
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution 
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in 
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer the-
reof.”100  In McCulloch, Marshall notes that the Constitution includes both 
express and implied powers.  He interprets “necessary and proper” to mean 
“convenient” and “useful” and finds that by virtue of this, “[u]nless a spe-
cific means be expressly prohibited to the general government, it has it, 
within the sphere of its specified powers.”101  Given this, it appears that not 
much is left of state residual sovereignty.102  At bottom, it appears that true 
power is consolidated in the federal government—the federal government 
is the sovereign.  The president is the focal point of that sovereign. 
Having established this, we must now explore the means by which 
power might be consolidated in the president.  We must explore the 
sources of unilateral executive action.  There are five primary support 
sources for such action.  The first source is the unitary nature of the execu-
tive office.  The second source of support comes from an affirmative find-
ing and expansive interpretation of implied executive powers under the 
Constitution.  This involves expansive interpretations of the take care, 
commander in chief, and foreign policy powers.  The third source of sup-
port comes from executive tools, including among others, executive orders, 
executive agreements, and executive signing statements.  The fourth source 
of support is the marginalization of the legislative and judicial branches.  
This includes the use of jurisdiction stripping, the impact of political par-
ties, and a resurgence of the politics of fear.  The final source of support 
comes from related legislation such as the Patriot Act, Military Commis-
sion Act, and Detainee Treatment Act. 
As discussed above, the Constitution stipulates that “[t]he executive 
Power shall be vested in a President.”103  This confirms the consolidation 
of all executive power in the president.  This also confirms the unitary 
character of executive power under the Constitution.  The unitary character 
in turn assists the president in his ability to act unilaterally.  Put differently, 
  
 100. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 101. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819). 
 102. U.S. CONST. amend. X (The Tenth Amendment states “powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the people.”).  However, this provides little protection if provisions such as the Necessary and Proper 
Clause are interpreted as implied powers with a seemingly open-ended scope. 
 103. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
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the vesting of executive power in a single individual enables that individ-
ual to act independently and with greater speed in wielding that power.  
These are key characteristics of the unilateral executive theory. 
The president also derives substantial authority from his implied con-
stitutional powers.  This is an important component of the aforementioned 
strong executive approach.  Proponents of this approach argue that the 
vesting clause of Article II operates as a grant of all powers executive in 
nature.104  In other words, they believe that contrary to Article I, which 
limits legislative powers to those “herein granted,” the vesting clause of 
Article II gives the president power beyond those specifically enumerated.  
In keeping with this theory, Article II does not expressly limit executive 
power to those herein granted.  Aside from this theory, many argue that the 
president is vested with broad implied powers.  Principal among such pow-
ers are his abilities to direct foreign policy, serve as commander in chief of 
the armed forces, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 
Through various constitutional provisions and by virtue of his role as a 
figurehead for the U.S. government, the president has the opportunity to 
create, initiate, and change foreign policy.  There are six principal avenues 
with which to do this.  These six avenues include responses to foreign 
events, proposals for legislation, negotiation of international agreements, 
policy statements, policy implementation, and independent action.105  Of 
the six, only proposals for legislation do not provide the opportunity for 
direct unilateral action.  The remaining five allow for direct unilateral ac-
tion and the establishment of a unilateral agenda.  Further, “[a]s spokesman 
and head of the foreign service, the armed forces, the intelligence services, 
and the bureaucracy, the President usually responds to such events and thus 
initiates U.S. policy.”106  Further still, “[t]he President as the chief spokes-
man of the Nation, directs Government officials and machinery in the daily 
conduct of diplomacy, and has the principal responsibility for taking action 
to advance U.S. foreign policy interests.”107  While Congress is capable of 
exercising some influence over foreign policy, because the president initi-
ates and is responsible for taking action to advance U.S. foreign policy, 
“the lion’s share . . . [falls] to the President.”108 
There may also be implied powers vested in the president by virtue of 
his role as the commander in chief of the armed forces.  Professor Julian 
  
 104. See Julian G. Ku, Is There an Exclusive Commander-in-Chief Power?, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET 
PART 84 (2006). 
 105. Richard F. Grimmett, Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress, CONG. RES. SERVICE 
REPS., June 1, 1999, available at http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/6172.htm. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS: 1787-1957, at 171 (4th rev. ed. 
1957).  
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Ku argued that the president “does possess an exclusive Commander-in-
Chief power that authorizes him to refuse to execute laws and treaties that 
impermissibly encroach upon his inherent constitutional power.”109  Ku 
explains that because the president is already vested with a general execu-
tive power, which includes the power to be chief of the armed forces, the 
“most sensible textual inference” is that the Commander-in-Chief Clause 
operates “as a constitutional constraint on the other two federal branches, 
especially Congress, from interfering with the President’s command.”110  
This interpretation provides the president with the power to act unilaterally 
even in the face of opposing laws or treaties.  This also seems to place the 
legislature in a position of subservience to the president.  Notwithstanding, 
Ku argued “[t]he existence of this exclusive power is supported by the text 
of the Constitution as well as judicial precedent and the practice of past 
presidents.”111 
Finally, there may also be implied powers in the constitutional man-
date that the president “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted.”112  This is confirmed by Madison’s Notes of Debates in the Federal 
Convention of 1787.  In his notes from June 1, 1787, Madison records a 
debate on “the extent of the Executive authority.”113  During this debate 
Charles Pinckney, a South Carolina representative to the convention, 
moved to strike out a constitutional provision conferring power on the ex-
ecutive to “execute such other powers not Legislative nor Judiciary in their 
nature.”114  In doing so, Pinckney explained that this language was “unnec-
essary” because the object of this language was already included “in the 
‘power to carry into effect the national laws.’”115  Tellingly, a vote was 
taken and because a majority agreed with Pinckney the words were in fact 
struck out.116  Overall, the Supreme Court has found that by virtue of the 
Take Care Clause the president has the implied power to act without statu-
tory authorization to enforce laws or protect federal rights.117  This of 
course provides an alternate justification for the exercise of unilateral ex-
ecutive action. 
In addition to implied or inherent powers, the president has various ex-
ecutive tools, which can employ unilateral action in furtherance of a unilat-
  
 109. Ku, supra note 104, at 84. 
 110. Id. at 85. 
 111. Id. 
 112. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added). 
 113. MADISON, supra note 4, at 47. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 48. 
 117. See Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63–64 (1890) (finding that there is an inherent power to 
protect resting by necessity in the executive). 
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eral agenda.  This is particularly true with regard to executive agreements, 
executive orders, and executive signing statements.  Executive agreements 
are agreements made between the executive branch of the U.S. government 
and a foreign government.  Unlike treaties, the president makes these 
agreements without the ratification of the Senate.  In United States v. Bel-
mont,118 the Supreme Court confirmed the validity of executive agreements 
and held that they took precedence over conflicting state policy.119  Simi-
larly, in United States v. Pink,120 the Court states that executive agreements 
“have a similar dignity” as treaties, and seemingly indicates that executive 
agreements might be on par with treaties.121  If this is true it means that 
executive agreements could be capable of overriding both state and federal 
law.122  In short, because executive agreements are given substantial weight 
and because the Senate does not confirm executive agreements, they pro-
vide the president with a powerful means of advancing a unilateral foreign 
policy agenda. 
Executive orders also represent very powerful tools.  An executive or-
der is a decree issued pursuant to executive authority, which can have the 
force of law.  Such orders can put forth commands to cabinet officers, “es-
tablish governmental bureaus, modify rules, change procedures, and en-
force existing statutes.”123  Despite their utility and longstanding use, crit-
ics have attacked executive orders.  They charge that many presidents have 
usurped the legislative power of Congress by issuing orders having the 
force of law while abandoning “any pretense of tying the executive order 
power to existing law.”124  They argue that “[b]ecause law, in essence, can 
be made at will, and sometimes in secret, [through executive orders] both 
Congress and the public are excluded from the entire legislative proc-
ess.”125  While legislative usurpation is surely a legitimate concern this 
argument misses the mark.  The legitimacy of executive orders qua execu-
tive orders is not wholly dependent on an affirmative legislative mandate.  
Rather, the president is vested with independent powers, which he may 
exercise through the use of executive orders.  As a matter of fact, these 
  
 118. 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
 119. Id. at 331–32. 
 120. 315 U.S. 203 (1942). 
 121. Id. at 230. 
 122. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194–95 (1888) (finding that when there is a conflict 
between a treaty and a federal statute the court will try give effect to both, but if that is not possible, the 
last in time will prevail).  Therefore, if executive agreements are tantamount to treaties they can over-
ride federal law, which contradicts and precedes them. 
 123. JAMES L. HIRSEN, GOVERNMENT BY DECREE: FROM PRESIDENT TO DICTATOR THROUGH 
EXECUTIVE ORDERS 6 (1999). 
 124. Id. at 8. 
 125. Id. at 14. 
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orders can be issued without congressional approval and can greatly assist 
the president in acting unilaterally. 
Another executive tool that has become a major point of contention is 
signing statements.  A signing statement is a written pronouncement issued 
by the president of the United States upon signing a bill into law.  They 
have been used as a tool to make substantive, legal, constitutional, or ad-
ministrative pronouncements on the bill that is being signed.  In recent 
years the prevalence and controversial use of presidential signing state-
ments has come under the microscope.  The controversy surrounds the use 
of signing statements to create legislative history, alter the intended inter-
pretation of a bill, limit the execution of a bill, or to declare that a provi-
sion of a bill is flat out unconstitutional.  Using signing statements in this 
manner can have a significant effect on both U.S. domestic and foreign 
policy.  This is poignantly exemplified by a December 2005 signing state-
ment, which asserts that the president can “bypass a statutory ban on tor-
ture.”126 
In placing the recent controversy over signing statements into perspec-
tive, it is helpful to observe that, “[i]n all, Bush has challenged more than 
800 laws enacted since he took office, most of which he said intruded on 
his constitutional powers as president and commander in chief.”127  This is 
somewhat alarming because, “[b]y contrast, all previous presidents chal-
lenged a combined total of about 600 laws.”128  Given the reinvigorated use 
of signing statements, it is not surprising that “Bush has virtually aban-
doned his veto power, giving Congress no chance to override his judg-
ments [and] . . . has vetoed just one bill since taking office, the fewest of 
any president since the 19th century.”129 
For these reasons the American Bar Association formed a task force to 
consider presidential signing statements and the separation of powers doc-
trine.  As a result of their investigation the task force found that “the issu-
ance of presidential signing statements that claim the authority or state the 
intention to disregard or decline to enforce all or part of a law the President 
has signed, or to interpret such a law in a manner inconsistent with the 
clear intent of Congress,” is in fact “contrary to the rule of law and our 
constitutional system of separation of powers.”  However, this controver-
sial use of signing statements is not without its defenders.  Proponents of 
signing statements urge that “[i]f the President may properly decline to 
enforce a law, at least when it unconstitutionally encroaches on his powers, 
  
 126. Charlie Savage, Bush Cites Authority to Bypass FEMA Law, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 6, 2006, at 
A1. 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. (emphasis added). 
 129. Id.  
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then it arguably follows that he may properly announce to Congress and to 
the public that he will not enforce a provision of an enactment he is sign-
ing.130  There is some force to this proposition.  The logical extension of 
this argument is that “a signing statement that challenges what the Presi-
dent determines to be an unconstitutional encroachment on his power, or 
that announces the President’s unwillingness to enforce (or willingness to 
litigate) such a provision, can be a valid and reasonable exercise of Presi-
dential authority.”131 
Notwithstanding, the use of signing statements is a troubling executive 
tool.  This is true for two reasons.  First, the use of signing statements may 
marginalize the legislative and judicial branches.  The legislature may be 
marginalized by having the meaning of laws changed, by having their laws 
selectively enforced, and by losing the opportunity to overcome executive 
objections through the standard veto process (a two-thirds majority vote in 
Congress as provided for by Article I, Section 7, Clause 2).  Also, the judi-
ciary and the practice of judicial review may be marginalized if the Su-
preme Court is compelled to accept signing statements as binding interpre-
tations of legislative or constitutional provisions.  Second, the use of sign-
ing statements is troubling because it is essentially unregulated.  Unfortu-
nately, the Supreme Court has not yet been presented with the opportunity 
to squarely address the limits of signing statements.  For this reason, by 
default, we are seemingly faced with unbridled executive discretion in their 
use.  Ultimately, the use of signing statements must be closely examined 
and limited to ensure fidelity to the separation of powers doctrine. 
It is also important to consider the role of political parties in the mar-
ginalization of the legislative and judicial branches of government.  Since 
our founding, “Madison’s vision of competitive branches balancing and 
checking one another has dominated constitutional thought about the sepa-
ration of powers through the present.”132  Madison believed that each 
branch of government would compete for power and as such “[a]mbition 
must be made to counteract ambition.”133  Competition between branches, 
in other words, was to be the synergist for the active implementation of 
checks and balances.  Surely, in the absence of political parties, “it was 
possible to imagine that, once elected, officeholders would not be tempted 
by constituent pressures and competing ideological or policy goals to sacri-
fice the constitutionally assigned duties and powers of their branches—
simply because constituent pressures and divergent interests were kept to a 
  
 130. Walter Dellinger, Memorandum for Bernard N. Nussbaum Counsel to the President, 48 ARK. L. 
REV. 333, 337 (1995) (memorandum dated Nov. 3, 1993). 
 131. Id.  
 132. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 53, at 2317. 
 133. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 71, at 319. 
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minimum.”134  This of course changed with the emergence of a strong two 
party political system. 
Professors Daryl J. Levinson and Richard H. Pildes argue, “the degree 
and kind of competition between the legislative and executive branches 
vary significantly, and may all but disappear, depending on whether the 
House, Senate, and presidency are divided or unified by political party.”135  
If competition disappears, what is left to counteract ambition?  For this 
reason, “[t]he practical distinction between party-divided and party-unified 
government rivals in significance, and often dominates, the constitutional 
distinction between the branches in predicting and explaining interbranch 
political dynamics.”136  It must be observed that the dynamic switches from 
competitive when political parties divide government, to cooperative when 
political parties unite government.137  This results in the disappearance of 
checks and balances during periods of strongly unified government.  As a 
result, the impact of political parties “calls into question many of the foun-
dational assumptions of separation-of-powers law and theory.”138 
Succinctly put, as a catalyst for unified government, political parties 
set the stage for presidential dominance.  Political parties can unify the 
three branches of government by espousing a certain ideology and vision.  
Meanwhile, the president is the head of his respective political party.  
Therefore, if this same party also dominates other branches of government 
it may be inferred that the president will wield a substantial influence over 
them.  As a practical matter, this may result in a consolidation of power in 
the executive.  A corollary of this is the marginalization of branches that 
are heavily influenced by political partisanship.  Parenthetically, in terms 
of marginalization, “the most serious damage has been done to the legisla-
tive branch” as is reflected by “[t]he sharp decline of congressional power 
and autonomy in recent years.”139 
The marginalization of coordinate branches is further bolstered by the 
presidents appointment powers.  The president may exercise this power to 
appoint government officials along party lines.  This of course extends the 
president’s influence even further.  In keeping with this, in The Steel Sei-
zure case, Justice Jackson noted that “[p]arty loyalties and interests, some-
times more binding than law, extend [the president’s] effective control into 
branches of government other than his own and he often may win, as a 
  
 134. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 53, at 2318–19. 
 135. Id. at 2315. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Al Gore, Address on Martin Luther King Day (Jan. 16, 2006), in HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 16, 
2006, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2006/01/16/the-full-text-of-al-gore_n_13930.html. 
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political leader, what he cannot command under the Constitution.”140  This 
might prove to be equally true for a presidential candidate.  Indeed, some 
might argue that it is more than a mere coincidence that the five Republi-
can appointed Justices of the Supreme Court, in resolving the 2000 presi-
dential election, voted in favor of George W. Bush while the four Democ-
ratic appointed Justices voted in favor of Al Gore.141 
Political parties may also make existing executive tools much more ef-
fective.  For instance, when government is strongly unified through politi-
cal party affiliation, the president may have a greater chance of success-
fully influencing the legislative process by recommending expedient meas-
ures.  In addition, his nominative and veto powers may also be reinvigo-
rated.  The president could enjoy a greater chance of having his nomina-
tions confirmed and a reduced chance of being overridden by a two-thirds 
majority after exercising his veto power.  Moreover, when government is 
united under a single political banner, the president may receive greater 
latitude in using signing statements, executive orders, and executive agree-
ments.  Similarly, he may also receive greater discretion in interpreting 
executive power, which paves the way for expansive interpretations of 
implied executive powers pursuant to the Take Care Clause, the Com-
mander-in-Chief Clause, and the foreign policy provisions of the Constitu-
tion. 
The magnification of executive power is alarming as it may very well 
operate as a one-way ratchet.  In other words, once the augmented powers 
are legitimatized it may not be possible to take them away.  This is particu-
larly alarming because it seems possible that augmented executive powers 
might be legitimized over time through mere tacit consent.  This is in keep-
ing with the notion that, through the Declaration of Independence, consent 
is established as “the complete ground of the legitimacy of all forms of 
authority.”142  What is more, in the face of a strongly unified government, 
the president may enjoy a reduced risk of impeachment.  In this way politi-
cal parties may actually reduce the effectiveness of the principal check on 
the exercise of executive power.  This is true not only by reducing the 
chances for successful impeachment—it is also true by reducing the risk of 
potential impeachment. 
  
 140. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).   
 141. See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 142. John Koritansky, Thomas Paine: The American Radical, in HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT 63 (Bryan-Paul Frost & Jeffery Sikkenga eds., 2003).  Additionally, as Koritansky observed 
“the doctrine of legitimation by consent has the consequence of obliterating distinctions among the 
manner or motive from which one gives consent.”  Id. at 64.  Therefore, Koritansky argued “[a] consent 
to someone’s authority that is extracted by threat would have to be said to be as legitimating as consent 
given in a mood of cool deliberation, balancing less pressing good and evils.”  Id. 
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Finally, political parties may also provide the executive with new 
tools.  This can be achieved through supportive legislation.  In the face of a 
strongly unified government, Congress may create laws, which expand 
executive power and potentially reduce the power of the judiciary.  Under 
this theory Congress operates as an executive instrument.  Put differently, 
party affiliation might transform the legislature from a coequal branch of 
government to a mere ministerial arm of the president.  For instance, the 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001,143 better known as 
the USA PATRIOT Act or Patriot Act, is a controversial bill that was 
signed into law on October 26, 2001, which provided immense power to 
the executive branch.  Notably, a Republican Congress passed this act and 
essentially bestowed its power on George W. Bush—a Republican presi-
dent.  More notably, the Patriot Act was passed with minimal debate after 
only forty-five days of consideration. 
Other examples of supportive legislation include the Detainee Treat-
ment Act of 2005,144 the Military Commissions Act of 2006,145 and the 
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2006,146 among 
others.  Each of these acts augments presidential power.  Notably, it was 
ensured that each was signed into law before the congressional elections on 
November 7, 2006.147  Boldly, the Detainee Treatment Act strips the Su-
preme Court of habeas corpus jurisdiction over detentions at Guantánamo 
Bay by placing “exclusive review” in a single federal court—the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.148  Acknowledging 
the number of detainees, the limited resources of this court, and the lack of 
an appeals process seems to reveal that exclusive review was established in 
this one court in order to prevent detainees from having meaningful access 
to the court system.  Similarly, the Military Commissions Act contains 
“habeas provisions,” which remove access to the courts for any alien de-
tained by the U.S. government who is determined to be an enemy combat-
  
 143. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
 144. Detainee Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2742–44 (2005) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)). 
 145. Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 
948 (2006)). 
 146. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 
(2006). 
 147. The Military Commissions Act was swiftly pushed through Congress and signed into law on 
October 17, 2006—just under three weeks prior to the Congressional elections. 
 148. Notwithstanding, the Supreme Court may have the ability to exercise habeas corpus jurisdiction 
under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (originally enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789).  
Subsection (a) of the All Writs Act authorizes the courts to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in 
aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 
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ant, or who is awaiting determination regarding enemy combatant status.  
This could allow the U.S. government to detain aliens indefinitely without 
prosecuting them in any manner.  In addition, the bill limits the ability to 
invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights.149 
The habeas provisions illustrate the controversial notion that the Or-
dain and Establish Clause150 and the Exceptions Clause151 provide Con-
gress with the power to unilaterally strip federal courts of their jurisdiction.  
This undermines the basic tenets of judicial review and marginalizes the 
role of the judiciary in government.  In Marbury v. Madison,152 Chief Jus-
tice Marshall confirmed the role of the Supreme Court as the ultimate ex-
positors of constitutional interpretation.153  More specifically, Marshall 
determined that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is [because] [t]hose who apply the rule to 
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”154  
From this it appears that the Court is properly charged with determining 
the constitutionality of executive action. 
In his January 16, 2006 Martin Luther King Day Address to the Amer-
ican Constitution Society and Liberty Coalition, Al Gore stated: “In a prop-
erly functioning system, the Judicial Branch would serve as the constitu-
tional umpire to ensure that the branches of government observed their 
proper spheres of authority, observed civil liberties and adhered to the rule 
of law.”155  The use of jurisdiction stripping then is tantamount to ejecting 
the umpire in the middle of the game.  The notion of jurisdiction stripping 
is particularly troubling when used as a vehicle to further a unilateral ex-
ecutive agenda.  As such, the practice of jurisdiction stripping seems to 
represent a clear violation of the separation of powers doctrine. 
In summary, a review of the five sources of support for unilateral ex-
ecutive action suggest that political parties may marginalize the legislative 
and judicial branches and may magnify the power of the remaining four 
sources.  Again, in the absence of such magnification, it appears that the 
power generated through the four sources would otherwise be constitu-
tional.  As was discussed above, unilateral executive action is not a consti-
tutional anomaly.  Rather, such action appears to have been intended by the 
framers and in reality may represent a constitutional necessity. 
  
 149. Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. § 948b(g). 
 150. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 151. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 152. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 153. Id. at 177. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Gore, supra note 139. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the degree to which unilateral executive action and agenda 
are acceptable must be determined relative to a number of considerations.  
Important considerations include necessity, security, and consistency with 
the spirit of government, which is encapsulated by the separation of powers 
doctrine.  However, principal among the considerations must remain the 
actual text of the Constitution.  But again, who is to interpret this text?  If 
the Constitution vests power in separate but equal branches of government, 
wouldn’t each branch be responsible for interpreting its respective powers?  
In Marbury, the Court establishes the basis for judicial review and answers 
this question in the negative.156  Changing the answer to this question now 
would fly in the face of over 200 years of jurisprudence.  For this among 
other reasons, the Court must define a separation of powers law, which 
enables them to take a more active role in establishing boundaries on ex-
ecutive power—boundaries that are both clear and workable.  Seemingly 
in furtherance of this goal, Professor Ku recommends that “[r]ather than 
deny its existence, the critics of [implied presidential power] should re-
frame their arguments to define reasonable limitations on the scope of . . . 
[that] power.”157 
More to the point though, the aim of this paper was to consider execu-
tive power, the separation of powers, and the unilateral executive theory to 
determine if presidential power under the separation of powers doctrine is 
actually a wolf in sheep’s clothing.  From the review of executive power 
and the unilateral executive theory it appears that we might answer this 
question in the affirmative.  However, to get a more definitive answer it is 
helpful to explore the genealogy of modern executive power. 
Professor Harvey Mansfield explored this topic in great detail in Tam-
ing the Prince.  Having carefully traced the roots of executive power 
Mansfield finds that “[t]he modern doctrine of executive power was begun, 
or better to say founded, by Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), with full 
consciousness of his departure from tradition, sanza alcuno respetto.”158  
This may seem shocking at first given the conceptual distinctions separat-
ing Machiavelli’s prince from our own president.  On closer inspection, 
though, our notion of executive power does appear to trace directly to Ma-
chiavelli.  Indeed, “the history of Machiavellism is chiefly a process of 
domestication, whereby Machiavelli’s thought was appropriated and ab-
sorbed by liberal constitutionalism so that it could be regularized and le-
  
 156. See Marbury, 5 U.S. 137. 
 157. Ku, supra note 104, at 84–85.  
 158. MANSFIELD, supra note 33, at xvii.  The phrase “sanza alcuno respetto” essentially means 
“without any respect.”  
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gitimized.”159  The byproduct of this process is a tamed prince in the form 
of a constitutional executive.  Thus, the constitutional executive is more 
“an invention of liberalism, of Locke, Montesquieu, and the American 
founders, rather than of Machiavelli and Hobbes.”160 
Still, through our constitutional executive, American republicanism 
“has not only republicanized English monarchy but also [it has] constitu-
tionalized the anti-constitutional Machiavellian prince, so that the impulse 
to get results, regardless of the Constitution, is incorporated into the Con-
stitution itself, and the devices of Machiavelli are made available to the 
office first held by George Washington.”161  By embracing the notion of 
executive power, the framers “imported not only the strength of monarchy 
but also some of the techniques of tyranny.”162  Despite this—or perhaps 
because of this—throughout Taming the Prince, Mansfield reflects on the 
ambivalence of modern executive power.  The ambivalence of modern 
executive power is rooted in temperance and functional utility.  In other 
words, Machiavellism has been tempered and incorporated in the Constitu-
tion to satisfy the mandates of necessity.  Thus, Machiavellism has been 
incorporated to ensure not only efficiency in administration but also to 
ensure adequate protection for the American regime.  The importance of 
such protection was alluded to by the Supreme Court in Cunningham v. 
Neagle, which found that there is an inherent power to protect that rests by 
necessity in the executive.163  Boldly, Mansfield finds that the Constitution 
“would not work without a branch whose function could be accurately 
described—though you might never hear it described that way—as getting 
around the constitution when necessary.”164  As Abraham Lincoln rhetori-
cally posited, “[a]re all laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the govern-
ment itself to go to pieces, lest that one be violated?”165 
Thankfully, the process of “getting around the constitution when nec-
essary” is only applicable in the most extraordinary of situations.  This is 
true by virtue of the broad implied powers, which our Constitution vests in 
the executive.  Generally, these broad executive powers ensure that the 
president does not need to get around the Constitution.  The president does 
not generally need to get around the Constitution, in other words, because 
  
 159. Id. at xix. 
 160. Id. at xviii. 
 161. Id. at xix. 
 162. Id. 
 163. 135 U.S. 1, 63–64 (1890). 
 164. MANSFIELD, supra note 33, at xix.  By contrast consider Justice Rehnquist’s notion that “[t]he 
laws will thus not be silent in time of war, but they will speak with a somewhat different voice.” 
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 225 (1998). 
 165. REHNQUIST, supra note 164, at vii (citing Abraham Lincoln, Message to a Special Session of 
Congress (July 4, 1861)). 
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the Constitution enables him to change from sheep to wolf in order to 
faithfully execute his office and “preserve, protect and defend the Constitu-
tion of the United States.”166  In this manner our president is empowered to 
meet the mandates of necessity without destroying our constitutional foun-
dation. 
If the executive is in fact a wolf in sheep’s clothing, it appears that 
Hamilton may be the one responsible for having slipped on the sheep suit.  
In fact, Professor Koritansky finds that “[t]he picture of American gov-
ernment that emerges from reflecting on Hamilton’s thoughts is that of a 
constitutional monarchy” and, therefore, “Jefferson and the republicans 
knew whereof they spoke when they branded Hamilton a ‘monarchist’ and 
a ‘monocrat,’ even if Hamilton never himself referred to his own thought 
in those words following the respectful repudiation of the avowedly mon-
archical stance he had taken in the Philadelphia Convention.”167 
Hamilton realized that power must be vested in one sovereign agency 
and that within that agency “sovereignty must come into a single point of 
focus or else what they do is in vain.”168  Notably, both John Locke and 
Thomas Hobbes stress this point “although Locke had also seen more 
clearly than Hobbes the need to veil the terrifying image of the monarch by 
calling for a body of legislators separate from the person of the execu-
tive.”169  Professor Mansfield concludes that “everyone agrees on the ne-
cessity of a strong executive, but also agrees, it appears, on the importance 
of concealing that necessity.”170 
It appears that the “veil” for Hamilton’s “liberal monarch” was pro-
vided by the separation of powers doctrine.171  While Madison emphasized 
the importance of this doctrine, through his carefully crafted explanation of 
executive power, “it was Hamilton rather than Madison who expressed 
what really held it all together.”172  While Hamilton helped to secure broad 
executive powers, it is clear that his efforts did not truly secure a constitu-
tional monarch.  Wholly aside from the extent of executive power, surely a 
monarchy cannot be established when each president is limited to two 
  
 166. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. 
 167. Koritansky, supra note 26, at 118. 
 168. Id. at 113–14. 
 169. Id. at 114.  Koritansky finds that it is  
pretty well established that Locke’s discussion of “executive prerogative,” read carefully, 
reveals the e[x]tent to which his doctrine of legislative supremacy is a formal requirement 
that can be dispensed with under severely extenuating circumstances; and thus legislative 
supremacy can be said to veil the Hobbesian character of libertarian government when cir-
cumstances are more ordinary. 
Id. at n.24. 
 170. MANSFIELD, supra note 33, at 2. 
 171. Koritansky, supra note 26, at 114. 
 172. Id. 
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terms in office.  For evidence of this one need look no further than the 
precedent set by Washington, which is now mandated by the Twenty-
Second Amendment.173  All in all, however, “[w]e remain perhaps closer to 
a constitutional monarchy than it is comfortable for a democracy to ad-
mit.”174 
  
 173. The Twenty-Second Amendment states:   
No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no person who 
has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to 
which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President 
more than once.  
U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1. 
 174. Koritansky, supra note 26, at 121. 
